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Procuring information from Lebanon’s government

by Sami Halabi

Instead, journalists are subjected to a labyrinth of information requests and bureaucratic red tape in order to get information, should it exist, or acquire interviews with government officials who, in theory, should be accountable to the public. Most just rely on anecdotal evidence or the opinions of “experts.”

“I don’t even bother trying to get information from government officials in Lebanon because they just send you from one place to another, tell you to get a paper from here and from there, and in the end you end up with nothing,” says Paul Cochrane, an Irish journalist who has been based in Lebanon for the past seven years. “It’s a bit like Waiting for Godot.”

The lack of transparency within Lebanon’s government institutions does not only apply to foreign journalists; local journalists fair just as badly. “The process is just way too long,” said Nada Nohra, a Beirut-based Lebanese journalist. Nohra described a recent attempt to acquire information from the Director General of Antiquities, the governmental body under the Ministry of Culture tasked with protecting Lebanon’s cultural heritage. In practice, the body has little authority and cannot physically stop the demolition of cultural sites now being torn down across Lebanon to make room for the country’s fledging real estate market. “When I put in a request to interview the head of the office it took them a week to reply,” said Nohra. “When they finally did, they rejected my request ‘because the issue was too complicated for them to discuss’.”

Later that day, Nohra called Lebanon’s Ministry of Culture to ask how long a previous post-war minister had been in office. “I called and they kept transferring me around,” she said. “Nobody could tell me how long he had been the minister!”

The only marked achievement in terms of government transparency over the past several years has been the introduction of websites for Lebanon’s 24 ministries. Though not all of them have websites (such as the Ministry of the Displaced), and some of those that do don’t function, such as the Ministry of Public Works and Transport.

With all this in mind, last month I embarked on a journey to gather information about Lebanon’s ‘legal prostitution’. Lebanon currently maintains a policy of effectively legal prostitution of foreigners whereby women are employed as “artists” in what the Lebanese affectionately call “super nightclubs” but are de facto prostitutes with little rights or government protection.  In an example of unintentional irony, the artists are subject to periodic medical examinations by General Security but are not legally permitted to have sex with the club patrons. If they are diagnosed with a sexually transmitted disease they are deported. Many of these women have their passports confiscated on arrival, are not permitted to leave the clubs during “working hours,” and are usually locked inside their clubs during “non-working hours.”

I began my research by calling the Ministry of Labor who duly informed me that the ministry does not have a media relations office nor do they keep records on Lebanon’s “artists.” Under the Lebanese law, these “artists” are not protected by the country’s labor code but instead by a separate legal framework set by the General Security office, the government body that regulates issues relating to visas and residency status of foreigners. These women’s “rights and obligations” are spelled out in a booklet issued by General Security entitled “Female workers in nightclubs, modeling and non-medical massage – rights and obligations.”

Naturally my next phone call was to the General Security offices.  General Security does indeed have a media relations office but they were not present when I called or when I eventually knocked on their door during working hours. I called the operator back who then informed me that, even if I did reach media relations, to acquire any information I would have to appear in person to fill out an application at the general secretariat’s office.

Not to be put off, I rang up the Ministry of Justice’s offices to find out how many cases have been filed by “artists” for rape, violence or theft. After having called a several times to no avail, an old coarse male voice finally answered and informed me that the ministry did not have a media relations office either. When I asked him whom I could speak to in order to get this information I was put on hold  and then transferred to another office, where a woman informed me that I had reached the wrong office again. I called the old man back and told him he had given me the wrong office. He transferred me to yet another office where another woman answered informed me that the ministry couldn’t help me; but I could speak to a woman named Huda at the Palace of Justice (Lebanon’s public courts). “Does she have a number?” I inquired. “No you will have to go see her,” she said. “What is her office number?” I asked. “First floor,” the woman said and hung up.

Fortunately for me, both the Palace of Justice and General Security’s offices are across the street from each other.  Since there is no official information desk at General Security’s offices, I used the time honored method of greeting a few loitering solder’s with a “God bless you” followed by a request for the location of the general secretariat’s office which I eventually found on the first floor of the building.

When I arrived and informed the soldier behind the desk of my intentions, he told me I was in the wrong place and had to go to the section that handled the affairs of the “artists.”

After blessing a few more soldiers I found the “artists” bloc tucked away in a hallway to the side on the ground floor of the building. Upon entering the section, I asked who I needed to speak to and was led into a room labeled the “questioning room.”  The room consisted of two desks and several filing cabinets that lined the walls. The soldier again asked me to wait. After around 10 minutes, I got up and walked to the entrance of the room where I saw five women– ostensibly of eastern European decent– enter the opposite room from a side door and march single file behind an Arab man holding a wad of papers into a room across the hall. As I watched the procession, along with every other male in the bloc, the soldier who initially had asked me to wait motioned me into another room at the end of the hall.

The office of the head of the artists section, lined on both sides with leather couches and one large desk at the far end of the room, was filled with soldiers. I made my way up to the officer and explained my situation. He refused to speak to me unless I filed a request to the general director through the general secretariat’s office. When I told him they had just sent me to him, he shook his head and told me to explain my situation to them once again.

After much conversation and a few confused facial expressions, the soldier at the general secretariat’s office agreed that I had to file an official request in writing, which included having it stamped to become a legal document.  After I did this he sent me to another office that handled the general director’s mail. The soldier then asked me for the publication’s press ID. When I explained to him that Lebanon’s Syndicate of Journalists would not give the publication a press ID because, as one editor-in-chief explained to me, “if they do, they will have to give it to everyone and they don’t want Hezbollah having them.” I sent the request by standard mail to the director of General Security. About a week later I received a call from a lieutenant at the director’s office who asked for my name and occupation and hung up. I didn’t hear back from their office until 3 weeks later, long after the article was published, when the general director of general security called– only to decline to provide the number of women that have filed cases for rape or mistreatment. He refused to offer anyone for an interview or give me a copy of the booklet given to the workers, agreeing only to give me the number of “artists” in the country: 1,070.

I then wandered over the public courts to find Huda. After many  “God bless you’s” I finally found the door that said “press.”  But when I tried the handle it was locked. I knocked. No answer. I tried the door a few more times then began to walk away when I saw the door swing open. There stood Huda.

Huda was indeed in charge of press relations but insisted that the issue of foreign female workers was not in her department. She gave me the name of another man named Joe and pointed to a door across the hallway.

When I entered Joe’s office and presented my request he laughed and told me that I was in the wrong building and had to go to the general prosecutor’s office and talk to a man named Tarek. Tarek, a short stubby man with a mustache said he couldn’t give me the information because it was “secret.” When I insisted, he told me to take it up with the head of his department, a local magistrate named Joseph.

I entered the magistrate’s office and told the soldier, who doubled as his secretary, what I was there for. He asked me to take a seat. While I was waiting, an old friend of mine who happened to be a lawyer entered and sat next to me. When I explained my situation to him, he asked me to step outside the office with him. “You have to feed [bribe] these guys to get information,” he said. He then walked into another office and introduced me to a man named Ali. Ali asked me to sit on a bench across the hall. I asked my friend if I should pay now or later. He said, later “he’ll tell you the price. If you agree then he will tell you how to do it.” I waited for another 10 minutes until Ali came out of the last door. He looked at me, raised his eyebrows and made a sliding motion with his hand. The deal was off.

Having failed to acquire my information through alternative methods, I made my way back to the magistrate’s office. I sat down and waited for my turn. A deafening bell went off and the soldier/secretary jumped up and entered the judge’s office. When he came back he asked me to enter. The judge introduced himself as Joseph. When I asked him about the figures he shook his head. “We don’t even categorize the lawsuits, so we can’t know,” he said. “It’s not like I even have a computer and can just click a button.”

I could sense an underlying annoyance in Joseph’s voice as he basically told me that he wanted to help me but he couldn’t. Indeed there was no computer on his desk, much less anything else for that matter.

Joseph is not alone. Many Lebanese seek a better and more efficient government. That desire however does not translate into votes come time for elections because there are “no issue politics in Lebanon,” as one MP told me in the run-up to the recent elections. For a journalist in Lebanon to learn about the inner workings of his government or to procure information—of a general or sensitive nature—often requires that the individual or publication develop close ties with government functionaries. Because of the politicized and sectarian agenda of most Lebanese publications, and the patronage system behind them, there is little hope for young or independent journalists to get responses to inquiries without compromising their objectivity. They must make sure that both the their publication’s agenda and their own articles adhere to the interests of the public figures they are using to acquire “public information,” in order not to risk being ostracized by any given public office for the rest of their careers.

Without pressure from the public, Lebanon’s institutions, let alone its media, have little incentive to reform or restructure in order to serve their people. It seems certain that without these reforms, its journalists will continue to ask many questions that will remain unanswered, such as the plight the of the country’s “artists.” In particular when it comes to information that establishment officials can agree should be withheld—such as abuse of migrant workers– even seasoned navigators of Lebanon’s patron system will have a difficult time getting straight answers.

First published in Menassat on August 11, 2009

Elections only fortify Lebanon’s sectarian politics

by Sami Halabi

Lebanon’s elections last month confirmed yet again that in this tiny Mediterranean country, sectarian politics are paramount. Long gone from the collective consciousness are the lessons of the 15-year civil war that began as a political and class dispute and descended into sectarian enmity. Forgotten also are the post-war years that led up to the recent elections and were characterized by the ebb and flow of civil strife.

Many would argue that digging up the past, runs the risk of repeating it. But in Lebanon’s case, allowing the issues that propelled Lebanon into civil conflict to fester has not proved useful, either.

The Taif agreement, which effectively ended Lebanon’s civil war, stipulates that all of Lebanon’s civil war militias disband. Even though many of the country’s sectarian militias still hold onto some of their weapons, only Hizballah maintains a sizable military arsenal. Lebanon’s continuing occupation by Israel remains the main justification for Hizballah’s armed presence outside of the state’s apparatus. Hizballah’s arms are a particularly precarious issue that came to a head in May 2008 when Hizballah and its allies faced off with pro-government forces in the streets of Beirut.

It’s also no surprise that today many of those who take issue with the group’s weapons outside the state’s apparatus are members of sects that resent the growing political, economic and military power of the Shia in Lebanon. Much of this enmity towards Hizballah stems from the constituents of areas that have suffered considerably less from recent Israeli aggression against the country. This includes former supporters of the Phalange party, which was supported by Israel during the civil war, and openly backed Israel’s invasion in 1982 and the occupation of Lebanon’s south that ended in 2000.

Another dimension of the confessional mishmash is the sentiment among wide swaths of Lebanon’s Christian community that they are becoming demographically marginalized by an increasing population of Muslims, particularly the Shia and supporters of Hizballah. Since the last elections, held in 2005 on the heels of the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, different factions within the Christian political elite have chosen to deal with the issue by either allying themselves with the ballooning demographic reality of Lebanon’s Shia, or opposing it.

Michel Aoun — a former military commander and acting president — is supported by many Christians in Lebanon. Recently he sarcastically thanked US President Barack Obama for “likening the Maronite [Christian] protectorate in Lebanon to that of the pandas,” referring to the US president’s speech in Cairo. Aoun’s party, the Free Patriotic Movement, is part of the Hizballah-led parliamentary opposition. In turn, some have pointed to the schism within the Christian community as evidence that the political dynamics of Lebanon are beginning to overcome their sectarian deficiencies. The reality of the matter however is much less encouraging.

Aoun’s alliance with Hizballah is based solely on sectarian principles. At no point since he forged the alliance did he forgo the opportunity to remind anyone who would listen that he represented the “majority” of the Christian population, thus reinforcing the nature of the alliance as one between sects and not political partners. When I asked an MP in his coalition why he is allied with Hizballah when their platforms contradict on many points relating to reforms, he laughed and said that there are “no issue politics in Lebanon.” Even though Aoun’s party gained more seats than in the previous elections, mostly due to Lebanon’s archaic electoral law, that “majority” turned out to be nothing more than wishful thinking and selective analysis facilitated by Lebanon’s reluctance to conduct polling or a population census, for fear of upsetting the sectarian “balance” in the country.

Moreover, many of Aoun’s Christian supporters who were initially disenchanted with the party’s alliance with Hizballah opted to support the March 14 coalition, a loose allegiance of former warlords and business magnates who won the recent election in a landslide through monolithic clannish voting. Hizballah’s actions did not assist Aoun. Shortly before election day, Hassan Nasrallah, the head of Hizballah, made an inflammatory speech addressing the issue of last year’s 7 May events and called them “a glorious day.”

What was so glorious about Beirut being taken over by masked gunman from Hizballah and its allies? Or their pro-government rivals setting up ad hoc checkpoints, making sure that no “undesirables” with Shia first or last names entered their sectarian enclaves? Such a declaration defies the bounds of common sense. That is, unless you are of the camp that believes Hizballah never wanted to win the election in the first place. While that may seem illogical to most, it is a real possibility that Hizballah would rather not deal with a debt-ridden economy that currently holds a debt-to-gross domestic product ratio of 170 percent.

Instead, what is increasingly becoming evident is that Hizballah will be satisfied, at least for the time being, with “assurances” that any new government will not attempt to rid it of its military arsenal or infrastructure. Whether it was intentional or not, Hizballah certainly dampened the support for Aoun amongst Lebanon’s Christians, even if that support didn’t reach his purported “70 percent” in the first place.

For its part, Hizballah is as keen as any to embrace the sectarian realities of Lebanon for its own purposes. The Party of God completely overwhelmed its opponents in its strongholds of Lebanon’s southern and western regions with the practically uniform voting of the country’s Shia. What’s more, Hizballah continues to provide social services solely to its constituents, further cementing the dependence and loyalty of many in the Shia community on the party, not to mention adding fodder to its detractors’ “state within a state” argument.

Somewhere in the middle of all of this are Lebanon’s Sunnis. Although they never had a formidable militia of their own, Lebanon’s Sunnis do possess one discernible weapon that everyone in Lebanon recognizes very well — money. Propped up by Saudi petrodollars, the Sunnis have managed to “buy” their way into power. The Saudis — who have many interests in Lebanon, ranging from fighters sympathetic to their tutelage in the north to real estate investments all over Lebanon — put forward large amounts of money (estimates range from $400 million to $1 billion) in Lebanon’s recent elections to ensure that their piece of Lebanon’s sectarian pie would not be eaten up by anyone else. It proved to be a worthwhile investment for the kingdom as their local patrons, the Hariri family and its allies, won a decisive election victory. Saad Hariri, the son of the assassinated former prime minister and head of the party that holds the largest share of seats in the new parliament, has just become Lebanon’s prime minister-designate after only four years in politics and never having assumed a ministerial portfolio or having been involved in implementing any of Lebanon’s much-needed reforms.

As the sectarian wheels of Lebanon continue to turn, they pull along the ability of Lebanon’s political elite to rule through a perpetual hand-me-down system. Hereditary inheritance of political power occurs across party lines, especially in the new parliamentary majority. The ruling March 14 coalition now includes five sons of deceased politicians, one sister, one wife, one brother and one 26-year-old daughter, Nayla Tueni. Tueni, who has never held any occupation other than working at her father’s newspaper, An-Nahar, is against a minimum quota for women in parliament. Moreover, when asked what she was going to do about 28.5 percent of Lebanon’s population living below the poverty line, she requested to send me a response by email. In her response, which was a superficial one at best, she said she would focus her “efforts” on her electoral district — one of the most affluent districts in the entire country.

Who is to blame for this situation? Essentially, it is the people who continue to reinforce the system by electing the same representatives or their progeny time and time again. Yet, it is the people of Lebanon who suffer the most from the lack of basic services or a functioning state, not the “leaders” they continue to elect. The reluctance of most of Lebanon’s population to admit to themselves that the core issue hampering progress in their lives is not which tribal lord rules over them for the next four years, but an unwillingness to keep God, and the absolute truth that he embodies, out of government. This is what is keeping them and their country on the brink of disaster, and surely this new government will be no different.

First published in Electronic Intifada on July 7, 2009

Hydrocarbon politics in the Eastern Mediterranean

by Sami Halabi

There’s an old saying in the oil industry: “Oil is like a wild animal. Whoever captures it has it.” The late American oil magnate, Jean Paul Getty, may have been talking about the oil and gas market of the 1950s, but his words continue to ring true. Ever since a joint US-Israeli exploration group headed by Texas-based Noble Energy discovered a large natural gas deposit at Tamar (90 kilometers off the coast of Haifa) in January, the proverbial animal has been officially let out of its cage in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Analysts estimate reserves at Tamar of around 142 billion cubic meters (BCM), valued at around $3.6 billion, with a $1.5 billion extraction cost. The discovery has been heralded by Noble’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Charles Davidson as possibly “the largest discovery in the company’s history.” For a company like Noble that boasts assets of more than $12 billion, that’s no passing phrase.
A few months after the initial discovery, Noble found another deposit of gas at Dalit, 13 kilometers east of Tamar. That discovery is expected to yield reserves of around 14 BCM, or around 10 percent of the Tamar find. Noble declined to comment on the finds and Executive is legally forbidden to correspond with Noble’s Israeli partners.
The amount of gas present in the two fields could potentially serve Israel’s gas demand for a decade, or even longer.
“We are witnessing an historic moment in Israel’s energy market,” Israeli Infrastructure Minister Binyamin Ben Eliezer said at the time of the Tamar find.

A thorny relationship
At present Israel depends on Egyptian gas exports to run its power plants. The agreement for Egypt to supply Israel with a constant stream of gas comes under a clause of the Camp David accords, signed in 1979, and stipulates that the two parties will set a fixed price for each million thermal units (MMBTU), the standard unit of measurement for commercial gas exports, which corresponds to around 28 cubic meters of gas. The export of Egyptian gas to Israel has been the cause of much controversy in Egypt where anti-Israeli public sentiment is pervasive 30 years after the two countries’ leaders signed a peace treaty.
The issue of Egyptian gas exports to Israel remains a thorn in the side of both governments; politically for the Egyptians and in terms of energy planning for the Israelis. Hence, while energy independence for Israel would constitute a negative for Egypt’s current account, it could also translate into some much needed wiggle room for Egypt’s autocractic government.
“The opposition parties are always questioning the wisdom of supplying Israel with gas,” says Ibrahim Saif, resident scholar specializing in the political economy of the Middle East at the Carnegie Middle East Center. “Egypt is [always] trying to downplay that subject because there is a sentiment in Egypt that is against supplying Israel with gas.”

How much do they really have?
While Israel’s estimated gas reserves seem promising, they are still just that, estimates. The numbers currently available only indicate a ‘geological reserve’ based on seismic surveys conducted from above the seabed. The fields still have to undergo an appraisal phase to ascertain how large the ‘proven reserve’ is and exactly how much of the gas can actually be extracted.
“The initial discovery does not provide a clear picture as to the structure of the field. You need a year until it becomes a proven reserve and only part of it can be extracted,” said Ziad Arbahe, a Syrian energy consultant.
Arbahe explained that commonly only 30 to 40 percent of a geological reserve can be extracted. There have been rare cases where up to 50 percent has been extracted, but this usually requires that a company inject water into a field, increasing operational costs and often damaging the field itself.
“In general, when there is a find, countries and companies are optimistic about the amount. But when you start to produce… the initial estimation is usually much higher than the actual amount,” Arbahe adds.

On the Lebanese side…
The recent discoveries have “caused a flurry of interest in the Lebanese offshore area,” says Charles Harmer, executive vice president of multi-client services at Spectrum Geo, the company that previously performed preliminary seismic surveys for the Lebanese government between 2000 and 2007.
Fawaz Mourad, the regional representative of Petroleum Geo-Services (PGS), agrees. His company  and Spectrum Geo have both conducted seismic surveys in Lebanon’s offshore area, which is part of the “Levantine basin.”
The Levantine basin is the underwater geological structure that is located beneath the territorial waters of Lebanon, Israel, Cyprus and Syria. The basin itself has “similar structures and formations” in both Israeli and Lebanese waters which makes “offshore Lebanon even more interesting and more prospective,” says Mourad.
Lebanese oil and gas exploration began in the late 1960’s and early to mid-1970’s with the drilling of several wells across the country. Then, like many things in Lebanon at the time, exploration came to a grinding halt when Lebanon’s civil war began in 1975. After the war, Syria and Lebanon formed the “Committee of Cooperation between Lebanon and Syria for Oil Exploration in Lebanon,” which lasted until Syrian troops pulled out of Lebanon in 2005 after the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.
“The order from [current Syrian] president Assad’s father was to help Lebanon by all means possible, even for free, to get oil out of Lebanese ground,” says Ali Haidar, a former member of the committee and current petroleum studies professor in Beirut. “There were some favorable interpretations of this behavior on some Lebanese sides and on others there were unfavorable [interpretations].”
During the run-up to Lebanon’s parliamentary elections, Nabih Berri, the country’s speaker of parliament and member of the current opposition, stressed the importance of “encouraging the exploration of [oil and gas] prospects in all the Lebanese territories,” ostensibly referring to the continuation of onshore exploration.
However, little headway has been made in Lebanon since pre-war drilling, despite the fact that Lebanon is part of the same geological structure where proven gas deposits have been found in Syria “only 40 kilometers from the Lebanese border,” says Haidar. Today, Lebanon’s old wells still sit idle and efforts to resume exploration have been “postponed” according to a senior executive at Lebanon’s Ministry of Energy and Water.
Ghazi Youssef, a member of Lebanon’s new ruling parliamentary coalition who used to manage the oil and gas file as an advisor to former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in the earlier part of this decade, is nonetheless pessimistic about the prospects of oil and gas aground in Lebanon. He says that the issue of exploring these wells should be put on a “back burner” because “all the reports I have seen in the past do not really show the possibility of a major find [onshore]. It’s mostly tar and other residue but not hydrocarbons. Things point more to the offshore fields than they do onshore.”

Move to water
Indeed, since 2000 the focus of the Lebanese government and international oil and survey companies has been on offshore exploration. In 2002, the Lebanese government entered into an agreement with Spectrum Geo to perform a two-dimensional seismic survey off the coast of Lebanon to supplement a survey completed in 2000, which did not require government permission “because of the location and the fact that there was no previous work in the area,” says Harmer. Two-dimensional seismic surveys are used to identify breaks and possible traps in geological formations where there is a high possibility that oil or gas may be present.
The agreement gave Spectrum Geo the right to gather data off the Lebanese coast at its own cost and to later sell the data to prospective oil companies on a licensing basis. The Lebanese government would then receive a percentage of the license agreement and get a copy of the final data.
“We had to try to sell it as many times as we could to cover our costs and then make a profit on it,”says Harmer.
The agreement itself, however, ended in 2007, and the government says Spectrum Geo has requested another five year agreement with the Lebanese state.
In both 2006 and 2007, the government commissioned another Norwegian survey company, Petroleum Geo-Services (PGS), to perform three-dimensional seismic surveys off the coast of Lebanon. Three-dimensional studies subject geological formations to sets of waves which then ‘bounce back’ off these structures to provide a clearer view below a surface.
But several experts have questioned the manner in which the three-dimensional studies were conducted. “Normally when you have such a huge possibility… you do a lot more than this,” says Haidar. Harmer of Spectrum agrees. “It is very unusual to shoot a [three-dimensional seismic survey] like that. I still don’t understand why they have shot those.”
Mourad of PGS, however, insists that the data acquired was “comprehensive” and that “there is enough data to allow the companies to drill. They don’t need to do more 3-D surveys. So if a bid-round takes place over the areas which are covered by the 3-D survey, then the oil companies are able to drill immediately, thus saving a lot of time,” he says.
According to Sarkis Hlaiss, general manager and head of Lebanon’s gas and oil installations committee at the Ministry of Energy and Water, the main reason that a more extensive survey was not done is that the Lebanese government and PGS are currently performing another two-dimensional survey on Lebanon’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which was only delimited — the process by which a country defines its borders — in May by a committee at the energy and water ministry. A source at the United Nations, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that the issue of border demarcation between Lebanon and Israel has yet to be officially resolved by the UN and stressed that maritime borders would only be addressed once the border delimitation on the ground has been completed. PGS insists that the issue is inconsequential.
“Even if they haven’t officially delimited it, it doesn’t mean that it is disputed. There is no dispute,” said Mourad.
In any case, most experts agree that it is premature to consider the possibility of common resources before all the results of Lebanon’s seismic surveys are completed to ascertain if there are fields shared with Israel. The results of the survey are expected to become available within four to five months.
“By the end of September we will have the complete data in two-dimensions and three-dimensions from PGS,” says Hlaiss.
The new survey will employ seismic technology developed by PGS that enables seismic waves to overcome the distortions caused by layers of salt present across the Levantine Basin. The results of the survey will provide data that is much clearer and more useful to prospective oil companies and the Lebanese government, who can negotiate better if a bidding round ever materializes.

Dollars for data
According to Mourad, PGS has invested “tens of millions of dollars” to acquire data off the Lebanese coast. The company “hopes to recover its investment by selling the data” to oil companies looking to enter any Lebanese oil and gas market, once the government starts a bidding round and offers licenses to companies to start drilling offshore.

“PGS has not sold any data for the simple reason that companies, when they own data, need to know that they can do something with it, like participate in a bid round,” said Mourad.
But in order to open up a bidding round, Lebanon would need to have a law that dictates the terms and obligations of both the Lebanese government and prospective oil companies — something the Lebanese government has been dragging its feet on for decades.
“Until now we don’t have a law, it’s a disaster,” says Hlaiss. All the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean who have access to the Levantine Basin have legislation that apportions their maritime territory into blocs, ready for sale to prospective oil companies looking to explore their offshore prospects. Cyprus opened its first bidding session in 2007, as did Syria.
Fortunately for Lebanon, they have some friends in high places within the oil and gas industry. Since 2007 the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (NORAD), as part of its ‘Oil for Development’ program, has been assisting the Lebanese energy ministry to draft a new law to the tune of “several million dollars to start putting legislation in place [and] actually start a bid round,” says one oil and gas industry executive who spoke on condition of anonymity.
Martin Yettervik, counselor at the Norwegian Embassy in Lebanon, says that the program is about institution building as opposed to drilling and is aimed at helping the Lebanese avoid the pitfalls of an energy dependent economy.
“For any country that is new to petroleum, it is important to take into account the economic effect of the petroleum economy, because it is different from other kinds of economic factors,” says Yettervik. “There are examples around the world where, when the petroleum economy dominates, it is to the detriment of the other fields in the country.”
Countries such as Nigeria and Iran have felt the pain of an economy overly dependent on petroleum resources. However the risk to Lebanon is not just economic. The potential for oil and gas revenues to play into Lebanon’s polarized and volatile sectarian political mixture is very real. One look at the electricity or telecommunications situation in the country and an ineffective or politically tainted oil and gas industry could be “another killer,” according to professor Haidar.
Nonetheless, Yettervik insists that the program has not become “a tool for one or another power factor in a country” and that “since the beginning we have seen a trans-political cooperation, even when the country was in the deepest of crisis,” referring to the 18-month political standoff that led to the May 2008 conflict in Lebanon.

Norway’s helping hand
The Oil for Development program is set to carry on until 2011, at the behest of the Lebanese government. In order to expedite the process of drafting the still non-existent law, the Norwegian government has contracted an international law firm to assist the energy ministry with setting up a bidding round and has trained several officials at the ministries of energy and water, and finance and environment. Both Spectrum Geo and PGS’s head offices are located in Norway, but Hlaiss insists that the Norwegian government “didn’t ask for anything in return.”
Yettervik admits that the program “gives the Lebanese authorities familiarity with the Norwegian system,” but insists that any collusion between the Norwegian government and its companies “would be contrary to the spirit of the program.”
The government has confirmed that the new law will allow Lebanon to alter the output of any firm that extract’s oil or gas, which, if done hastily, could damage any potential field and substantially reduce its long term productivity. Moreover, the law will oblige future oil companies to adhere to the Lebanese labor law, which compels them to hire a majority of Lebanese citizens if qualified persons are present in the country.
According to the energy ministry and the Norwegian embassy, the draft exploration law is all but completed. The text, which is still in English, is complete and is in the translation process. Once in the Lebanese Parliament, it will be subject to the scrutiny of the country’s conflicting political interests.
“We are trying to push [the law] through this government,” says one government official who spoke off the record. “If we don’t, and the minister [of energy and water] changes, it will take us another three months to explain to the new minister what we are doing and then who knows [how long it will take].”
MP Youssef expressed his coalition’s desire to depose the current minister, whose party is part of the opposition, but insists that it will not derail the process.
“We believe that when someone comes to power you don’t just take everything and throw it down the drain; there’s continuity. We have to deal with [the law] and try to finish it as soon as possible.”

Sharing with the enemy
Perhaps the most important point to consider in Lebanon’s energy saga may be that if Tamar, Dalit or another field is a common field between Lebanon and Israel then the latter is currently usurping Lebanon’s natural gas.
“Whoever starts before gets the resources because of drainage,” says Haidar, adding that the clock is now ticking down on the Lebanese government’s opportunity to tap this resource before the Israelis do.
Contested borders have always posed a problem in the Middle East, especially when it comes to hydrocarbon resources. The “neutral zone” between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait that was demarcated by the Anglo-Turkish convention in 1913 still exists today. It has been a source of ongoing disputes over maritime borders between Kuwait and Iran for some time, although Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have come to an agreement over how to share the resources present in the area. Lebanon and Israel however remain in a state of war, and Israel still occupies some of Lebanon’s territory. Hence the issue of sharing resources, if indeed they do exist, seems far-fetched at best; more likely, perhaps, is the prospect of further conflict between the countries over energy.
“This is not going to be an easy issue,” says Saif. “If Israel starts to pump and utilize [any common resource], it would be a source of contention and Lebanon will find itself forced to move and to block any Israeli unilateral move.”
Most experts agree that it is highly improbable that the recent finds at Tamar and Dalit constitute a common field because of the distance between the finds and the border area, but that does not preclude the possibility of it being one or that one could exist, given the commonalties between the Lebanese and Israeli areas of the Levantine Basin. Just to make sure Israel is aware of Lebanon’s territorial concerns, the  prime minister’s office has sent a letter to Noble demanding that the company does not encroach upon Lebanese maritime territory, according to a government source who spoke on condition of anonymity.
Even if Lebanon does manage to pass a law, starts the bidding process and brings in the oil companies in to begin drilling, the economic benefits will not be felt until much further down the line. The Tamar field is not expected to produce commercial quantities of gas until at least 2013. One energy consultant offered to bet this journalist $1,000 that commercial quantities would not be extracted before 2015. Moreover, any potential Lebanese field may take even longer enter production.
“In eight years, if we find something, we can actually open the lid and start making some money. Whoever wakes up first gets the money and the resources,” says Haidar.
If the Lebanese don’t wake up soon, they may well find themselves snoozing through yet another regional boom and lose the chance to revive their debt-ridden economy.

First published in Executive Magazine’s July 2009 issue

Vote fraught with fraud, corruption and coercion

by Sami Halabi

Lebanon’s June 7 parliamentary elections are expected to be a close affair, pitting the March 14 coalition against the opposition parties of Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, Hezbollah and Amal. The elections are unprecedented in many respects, not least of which is the introduction of a new electoral law.
Lebanon’s new electoral law is unique in the region, addressing core issues such as media objectivity during the elections and campaign finance. The reforms are a step towards adopting legislation that would bring Lebanon’s elections in line with international standards. But the current legislation is “diluted by significant loopholes,” said Madeline Albright, the former United States Secretary of State, when she touched down in Beirut to head a delegation to monitor elections from the National Democratic Institute (NDI).
The loopholes are many, but certain reforms that did not exist prior to this year’s elections have been adopted. Not least of which is Lebanon’s newly formed Constitutional Council that can adjudicate contraventions of the electoral law.

Spending caps skirted
In theory, the new election law stipulates that an “electoral campaign account” must be established for each candidate and “all electoral contributions and expenses shall be exclusively made through this account during the period of the electoral campaign.”
The law restricts each candidate to a campaign spending limit, including pay-in-kind expenses, of approximately $100,000, plus a variable of around $2.66 per registered voter in an electoral district, which is measured by the Ministry of Interior’s list of registered voters. But the actual number of eligible voters in a district is impossible to calculate because Lebanon has not conducted a census since 1932.
“Candidates are required to do all their spending from their electoral account, but they can make transactions from their personal accounts or their family’s accounts and no one can know,” said Lynne Ghossein, the campaign finance project manager at the Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA).
One possible solution to this skirting of the law would be to monitor candidate’s personal accounts or those of their families. But this provision is not included in the new electoral law.
“I gave my opinion while discussing the draft electoral law and I said very openly that we cannot limit banking secrecy to the campaign account,” said Lebanon’s Interior Minister Ziad Baroud at a press conference for the Supervisory Commission on the Election Campaign (SCEC). Baroud is responsible for insuring the SCEC fulfills its mission of implementing the new electoral law.
Lebanon is one of the only countries in the world that maintains a policy of banking secrecy on personal accounts. Banking secrecy can only be lifted by the Special Investigation Committee (SIC) of the Lebanese Central Bank.
“We have not lifted banking secrecy on any candidate’s accounts nor received any request to do so,” said Hisham Hamzeh, director of the audit and investigation unit at the SIC.
Hamzeh explains that banking secrecy is only lifted in order to investigate suspected “terrorist” activity, as well arms and narcotics trafficking and money laundering. Even if candidates are found to have violated the campaign spending clauses of the electoral law, the public would not find out about it until after the elections, when many of the candidates will have already assumed office.
“The only thing that can happen is when the election is over someone does the inventory and campaign auditing for a candidate. [Then] they can see that there is more money spent than what was in the [electoral campaign] account,” said Nadine Farghal, legal counsel and coordinator at the Lebanese Civil Campaign for Electoral Reform (CCER). “This way they can see that [the candidate] has used another account.”
Violations of campaign financing regulations are to be submitted to Lebanon’s Constitutional Council, whose formation has been delayed for years. On May 19, a group of 55 Lebanese civil society organizations and eight universities sent a formal letter to President Michel Sleiman demanding the creation of the Constitutional Council.
On May 26 — less than two weeks before the election — Lebanon’s cabinet finally appointed its half of the council’s membership (five out of the 10 seats). The council is Lebanon’s highest judicial body that can rule on the constitutionality of the elections and is seen as an essential judicial organ providing an alternative to violent conflict over electoral contentions.
In addition to being prevented from tracking the personal accounts of candidates, the SCEC can only begin to monitor campaign accounts from the point when candidates officially submit their eligibility, a period that ran from March 2 to April 7. Hence, supposing that candidates do follow the letter of the law and only use their campaign accounts to fund their campaigns, there is still no adequate mechanism in the law to account for the total amount spent on a campaign, which began well before the submission period.
“The monitoring time is [too] short and we didn’t get the time we wanted,” Baroud said.
Yara Nassar, executive director of the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections, said that long before the monitoring period began, candidates used their own accounts or that of their party. She said the lack of an official commission to report violations in the run-up to the election period is another significant shortcoming of the new law.
“This is the first time the SCEC is here,” she said. “They haven’t been around for four or five years and this is part of the problem.”

Foreign influence
In theory, Lebanon’s new electoral law specifically prohibits candidates “from accepting or receiving, whether directly or indirectly, contributions or aids from foreign states or from a non-Lebanese natural or legal person.”
But without oversight on candidates’ personal accounts, there is technically little to stop candidates from ignoring the law and accepting the support of foreign entities willing to dish out cash to support their interests.
“Candidates can receive money in other accounts then transfer it to their electoral account,” said Gaelle Kibranian, programs director at the LTA. “We cannot know where this money is coming from.”
Lebanon’s role as a battleground for regional and international players makes it a prime candidate for illegal money entering the country to support one side of the political divide more than another.
“Can you say that Hezbollah doesn’t take money from Iran or Saad Hariri doesn’t take money from Saudi or [Michel] Aoun from Qatar,” added one legal expert who spoke on condition of anonymity. “It’s all around the media and no one is investigating it.”
The practice of accepting foreign money has become so commonplace in affecting the course of Lebanese politics that many politicians have heralded it as a necessary element to achieving their political aims. Ahmad el-Assad, a candidate running for the Shiite seat in the Marjayoun electoral district and founder of the Lebanese Option Gathering (LOG), said he has “no problem” with accepting financial help from Saudi Arabia or the US “because if we don’t do that things don’t move forward.” However, he denied receiving any funding for his campaign from foreign sources.
His organization aims to provide an alternative to Hezbollah’s influence over Shiites in the south of Lebanon. Assad accused Hezbollah and its allies of intimidating the residents of Lebanon’s south and of receiving “tens of millions of dollars” from Iran. Hezbollah declined to comment on Assad’s accusations.

Vote buying
International and local election watchdogs say the biggest obstacle to preventing vote buying is the balloting system in Lebanon. Ballots can be printed or written out on any piece of paper and parties usually hand out their pre-printed “list” before a voter enters a polling station.
A party can hand out a variety of ballots, with candidates listed in any order and any font. This in turn allows political parties to trace the ballot back to a particular voter or bloc of voters.
Despite repeated calls by civil society and some government figures like Minister Baroud, the proposed introduction of standardized, pre-printed and government distributed ballots at the polls was not included in the 2008 Election Law, due to opposition from parties on both sides of the political spectrum.
“We know that the buying happens at the ballot because it is just a piece of paper and they [candidates and parties] put signs on it and pay for the votes afterwards,” the LTA’s Kibranian said.
She said each party has representatives at the polling station during vote counting who, in turn, monitor the number of votes cast for each candidate or list of candidates.  CCER’s Farghal said the markings are usually simple alterations in the lists of candidates, such as having the “second name in italics or the third name in a different font.”
Election observers agree that most of the ballot rigging happens at the ‘family level,’ whereby large families in electoral districts agree to arrange for their family members to cast votes for a certain candidate or list of candidates. Once the ballots are counted, each family then receives cash or pay in-kind services according to the number of counted votes.
“We have witnessed representatives of the candidates marking each name when they count the votes,” said Nassar of LADE.  “They see the ballots they need to mark and then they mark their own register.”
But it’s not just families that take part in vote buying corruption. An anonymous source working with one of the major Christian opposition parties in Lebanon said his party  recruited through an “electoral pyramid scheme,” whereby the amount of money ‘recruiters’ make increases with the number of people they ‘recruit.’ The source has agreed to vote for the party in question and act as a representative at the polling booth.
“All they wanted was a photocopy of my ID,” the source said. “If you have a car they need your driver’s license and you can get more [money] because they ask you to transport people.”
The source said he was receiving $100 for his vote and $100 to man the polling station come June 7.
Candidates and parties are also looking to bring votes back to Lebanon from abroad, and with it the voters, because current legislation does not allow Lebanese citizens to vote outside the country.
An anonymous source in Dubai with links to a prominent Sunni party said the electoral pyramid scheme that applies to local vote buying is also being put to use abroad. The source said that parties are giving voters abroad, especially those from tightly contested districts, either airline ticket vouchers or sending them tickets directly.
While this is not technically an illegal practice, the electoral law specifically states that transportation costs must be deducted from a candidate’s electoral campaign account.
“If you can prove that the candidates themselves are paying for people to fly in from abroad to come and vote for them, then it can be counted as campaign spending,” said Farghal.
As for the foreign staff in charge of recruiting voters, the payment of their salaries will not pose much of a problem in circumventing the law.
“If I am a candidate and I have a lawyer, even if he is not a very smart one, I will find a way to make it seem like these people [foreign staff] are volunteering to get me more votes abroad,” added Farghal.
The current law allows for volunteers to provide services for free which are not counted as campaign expenditures.

Pay-in-kind and your vote is mine
Apart from candidates merely paying people in cash to further their campaign, many parties and candidates are blatantly disregarding the illegality of pay-in-kind services to further their campaigns.
In May the March 14-affiliated Kataeb party advertised on its website that it had distributed free medicine and healthcare in a “special for the campaign.”
El-Assad’s campaign also “distributed health cards that were conditional upon voter choices,” according to a report issued by LADE. El-Assad admited to this violation but says that it pales in comparison to Hezbollah’s violations. Hezbollah declined to comment.

The media’s bark
The new electoral law aims to restrict Lebanon’s sectarian media landscape from unbalanced reporting on the elections. Given that each major media outlet in Lebanon belongs to one political party or another, this is turning out to be an uphill battle for the SCEC.
“Our media landscape is controlled by people who are running in the elections and obviously they will use their media outlets for their own purposes,” said Roula Mikhael, executive director of the Maharat Foundation, a local NGO that is monitoring the media during the elections.
The SCEC’s first report in early May identified 293 media violations of just one article of the electoral law committed over 14 days, from April 14 to April 28. The report covers several categories of contraventions across different types of media that include libel, slander, defamation and broadcasting that triggers sectarian tensions.
The first report contained no specifics as to who committed which media violation because of what head of the SCEC Ghassan Abu Alwan, called “a period of forgiveness.” Minister Baroud added that “we should not consider that it is impossible for the media to follow the law.”
The media organizations however seem to be above the law as they enjoy widespread support among large swaths of the Lebanese public because of their political and religious affiliations. Nassar of LADE explained that the issue of addressing what the media are allowed to do is “something that the authorities in Lebanon are afraid to tackle or take action against,” because “even if the court says you are right, you are well documented and you have everything you need to do this, public opinion could sway against you.”

Piles of posters
The new law also lays out the explicit terms for displaying political posters by which each municipality must assign spaces for display.
But given Lebanon’s municipal elections are scheduled to be held next year, municipalities have a lot to consider if they are to take down illegal posters of a candidate who could represent them in government after June 7.
“Municipalities are usually politicized so they will not, in most cases, forbid people from hanging posters of a certain figure,” said Tony Mikhael, lawyer and legal expert at Maharat. But since the beginning of May, reports have surfaced that the law is being applied in some areas of Lebanon, but “if you go outside of Beirut you see the chaos when it comes to hanging pictures,” said Mikhael.
This practice has greatly impeded any monitoring body’s ability to track campaign expenditures on campaign posters. The SCEC has declared that the cost of any promotional material that even alludes to a candidate or their party will be counted against their campaign account. On the ground, however, there are always ways around such rules.
“You cannot forbid people from placing posters on private property,” Tony Mikhael said. “If you put a picture on the roof or balcony of a building, the municipality can do nothing.”

Abusing public office
Public officials have been accused by various monitors and NGOs of abusing their public offices to promote their campaigns. One of these is the telecommunications Minister Gebran Bassil who recently sent out a voice recording to mobile phone subscribers advertising Lebanon’s recent deduction in phone tariffs.
The message started out by saying “This is not a lie, but the truth” mentioning the minister’s name, but not that of his ministry, which prompted a flurry of accusations. His office said that he recorded the message on April 1, before he submitted his candidacy. Gebran’s office said “technical reasons” caused some subscribers to receive the message later.
Even Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri, an opposition leader, has been criticized by LADE for promoting himself and his electoral list by giving speeches at the opening of public events.
Ali Hamdan, a senior adviser to Berri, said that the SCEC has approved of all of the speaker’s speeches, and in turn accused LADE of being biased.
“The US is supporting this NGO so how can they be neutral,” said Hamdan. “They are not neutral anymore and [hence] they should be phased out.” LADE declined to respond to the allegation.
The mudslinging will most likely continue well into and past the elections. But with the legal body to prosecute violations in place, the law now has some teeth. And, with some key reforms advocated by civil society already enacted, there is a sense that the ball has at least started rolling on the path to a democratic process that is in line with international standards.

First published in Executive Magazine’s June 2009 issue

by Sami Halabi

On 1 March 2008, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon came into effect pursuant to the request of the Lebanese government and United Nations Security Council resolutions 1644 and 1757. The trial is intended to bring to justice to those who carried out the assassination of former Prime Minister of Lebanon Rafiq Hariri and 22 others.

Throughout his time in government, Hariri enjoyed close ties to western governments and figures, the most notable of which being the former French President Jacques Chirac who now occupies an apartment on the Seine formerly owned by one of Hariri’s sons. In addition to courting western governments, Hariri was also saddled with the task of weighing the interests of regional powerhouses like Syria — who many inside of Lebanon blame for Hariri’s killing — and those of his western allies. Ultimately it was a balancing act that proved to be too daunting for the late PM.

Lebanon itself is no stranger to violence or political assassinations. Two presidents and three prime ministers in total have been assassinated since Lebanon’s independence from France in 1944. To boot, during its 15 year civil war (1975-1990) thousands of civilians were murdered and tortured by many of the same individuals that currently occupy some of the highest posts in government and control the country’s political arena. The country’s civil war finally came to an end upon the signing of the Taif Accord engineered in large part by the late Rafiq Hariri himself.

Given this small Levantine republic’s violent past, the explosion that ripped through the heart of Beirut on 14 February 2005 that claimed Hariri’s life may not seem worthy of a tribunal with an “international character” or the invocation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Chapter VII authorizes the use of force “by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” including “demonstrations, blockade and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations” and is usually reserved for events that threaten global stability such as the Korean War and the 1948 call for a ceasefire in Palestine.

Under such circumstances one would think that the inauguration of the court would have been welcomed with the usual fanfare that typifies political events in Lebanon.

However, on a fateful morning in March of this year, Beirut’s residents awoke to a day just like any other.

Apart from a few news blurbs and newspaper headlines, there was little feeling that justice had been duly been served. The only marked difference on that windy March morning was the discontinuation of a long-running series of digital clocks positioned around Beirut marking the days that had passed since Hariri’s death. The clocks adorning the facades of the late Rafiq Hariri’s many commercial and real estate possessions are accompanied by slogans that boldly and simply exclaim the need for “the truth for Lebanon’s sake.” The clocks are strategically positioned around Beirut in places such as Hariri’s own piece of Lebanon’s sectarian media landscape (each confessional group in Lebanon has a TV station dedicated to its cause) and even on the graveyard built to house the victims of the bombing in the center of downtown Beirut.

The cessation of these clocks signifies more than just a passing occurrence in the tumultuous history of Lebanon. For months, these clocks were a reminder to every citizen of Lebanon that their grievances have not yet been addressed. For 1,476 days (to be exact) someone wanted the Lebanese to believe that this time it would be different. That somehow Lebanon — a country with no constitutional court, and a legislative branch so close to the executive they might as well be the same body — could possibly achieve something as fleeting as justice.

The slogans proclaiming the need for “the truth for Lebanon’s sake,” still stand next to the fizzled-out timepieces and the world’s interest in supporting the raison d’etre for the tribunal seems to have abated all the same.

To understand why these events have taken place requires a memory that spans longer than the 100-odd days Barak Obama has been president of the United States. Finger-pointing in the Middle East was a simple and logical political task at the time Hariri was murdered. His stature with the West made it easy to blame (rightly or wrongly) Lebanon’s pro-Syrian security officials for his killing.

In August of 2005, four of Lebanon’s top security officials were detained and held without charges of any kind brought against them. The decision to arrest them came in the midst of the Bush era, a time when, as former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice once said, the region was still suffering from its “birth pangs.” That same month, John Bolton was appointed as US ambassador to the United Nations. John Bolton later added Syria to the infamous Axis of Evil list because of the country’s possession of the still chimerical “weapons of mass destruction.”

Again, none of this seemed surprising at the time. The western world, and especially the US, was on a voluntary collision course with the Iranian Republic over its alleged nuclear weapons program. Syria was (and still is) Iran’s main ally in the region and the Lebanese were all too ready to prostrate themselves to an imposed idea of justice. The UN and the powers that control it were so intent on seeing the tribunal come to fruition that they subverted the Lebanese parliament — which was in a state of stalemate due to the petty political squabbling of Lebanon’s leading factions — to acquire the legal footing to go ahead with the tribunal. The UN even sat by and watched while the accused sat in jail without being charged for more than three and a half years.

Many things have changed since then. The US, Iran and Syria are now flirting with the idea of rapprochement, albeit for their own regional interests. The Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has since broken out of isolation to the point where Jimmy Carter “wouldn’t be surprised” if the US and Syria restored full diplomatic ties by the end of this year.

On 27 April 2009 the special tribunal made its first decision but did not inform the press. Two days later the court ordered the Lebanese authorities to “release with immediate effect” the four security officials held since August 2005 because they cannot be “considered suspects or accused persons.” The move is seen by many to be a victory for Lebanon’s opposition coalition headed up by Hizballah.

The only “truth” in this anomalous turn of events seems to be Lebanon’s unabated eagerness to embrace the interests of other nations. First, it was the Hariri-led anti-Syrian parliamentary majority who heralded the tribunal as proof of Syrian involvement and brutality in Lebanon (which was evident during its nearly 30-year-long occupation of the country). Today, the Hizballah-led pro-Syrian opposition is pointing to the verdict as a victory for “justice.” The opposition has long claimed that the tribunal lacked credibility due to its politicization.

Indeed, when one looks at which nations actually bank-rolled the whole affair, which was expected to cost over $190 million and last more than three years according to Robin Vincent, the former registrar (another name for chief administrative officer) of the special tribunal, it is little wonder who is putting their money where the interest is. To date, most western countries and a collection of “regional states” who have “exercised their right to remain anonymous,” says Vincent, have put forward over $65 million already.

Vincent resigned less than three weeks ago (16 April). When I spoke to him in March he was glad to inform me that the holding cells for the four accused in the Dutch seaside resort of Scheveningen were all too ready to accept them. He did however seem rather annoyed that the request to transfer the accused had yet to be made. Now I realize that Vincent’s resignation was linked to the latest decision to release the security officials. After all, who would want to run a tribunal with no one to try?

Sometime between March and 27 April it seems that the decision was made to let Syria off the hook, whether they committed the act or not. This has left the door open to a multitude of potential targets. Who will now be blamed for the killing will depend on when global powers can come to a decision on who their “terrorist of the day” is.

In the meantime, the Lebanese have proven that they are still not ready to make their own decisions about the future of their nation. In approximately one month, Lebanon will go to the polls to vote for its next parliament and it is expected to be a close affair. Whoever wins will bear little consequence on the ground since both sides of the political spectrum are neither free nor independent of their external backers. The best case scenario seems to be a hung parliament; the worst case scenario is another war.

More than 15 years have passed since its civil war and Lebanon still does not have a nation to speak of. Its institutions are corrupt black holes of bureaucracy. Its people, divided by the aspirations of others, still lack a sense of common purpose. Their political discourse remains one of sectarian rivalry instead of public interest. Their impetus for voting remains the prevention of “the others” from taking power. And, if the recent events are anything to go by, their notion of justice will remain as empty as it ever was.

First published in Electronic Lebanon on May 4, 2009

Communications network a mess and a national shame

Hariri trial projected to cost more than $190 million

by Sami Halabi

Although, many would argue that the concept of justice should carry no price tag, and indeed they may be right, anyone who has ever received an invoice form their lawyer knows very well that justice is by no means cheap.

There are however precedents that justify the costly application of justice over a frugal one. In 1999, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed resolution 1272 effectively creating the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor. Only $6.3 million was budgeted for the proceedings that consisted of around 50 trials involving over 80 defendants even though initially the court originally issued indictments for almost 400 people. The trials’ creation was dogged by inefficiencies relating to recruitment, translation and the application of legal systems among other items. Ultimately, when the United Nations (UN) ceased to funding for the court approximately 1000 cases ranging including murder, rape and torture had yet to be tried and remain pending to this day. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) — originally budgeted at $56 million of which $13 million was to be provided by the Government of Cambodia (GoC). The trials, which were scheduled to take place between June 2006 and June 2009, came across funding issues when the GoC was not able to fulfill its financial commitments leaving the court $4 million short of its intended target size. Last month a new request for funding, as well as an extension of proceedings until March 2011, was presented for an additional $115 million. That brought the total proposed cost of the court, with only five accused, to $170 ($36 million per accused). The case is viewed as a financial disaster for international justice by many.

On March 1 2008, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) came into effect pursuant to the request of the Lebanese government and UNSC resolutions 1644 and 1757. On the surface, the explosion that ripped through the heart of Beirut on February 14^th 2005 killing 23 people may not seem like an act worthy of a tribunal with an “international character” or the invocation of chapter seven of the UN charter- an action that stipulates the authorization of the use of force, “by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” including, “demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.” Indeed, such events are not uncommon around the Middle East and have become almost synonymous with the region’s image around the world. Nevertheless, the use of such heavy-handed language is ostensibly the result of the fact that the pick-up truck filled with around 1000kg of TNT that caused the explosion killed Lebanon’s “western-backed” two-time Prime Minster (’92-’98, ’00-‘04)  and business magnate Rafik Al Hariri.

The tribunal is the legal successor to the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission (IIC). As with almost any international mechanism aimed at seeking justice, the commission and the STL have been the subject of a great deal controversy mainly revolving around the alleged politicization of the investigation and subsequent tribunal. “There are always claims around every tribunal that there is some politicization because you only have to have the USA put money in and you will find that strait away people will say that there is politicization,” says Robin Vincent, registrar of the STL, in effect the chief administrative officer for the tribunal. The four former security officials accused of plotting the February 14^th attacks have been held in Lebanon since late 2005 without trial and are currently awaiting transfer to a holding center in the popular sea-side resort of Scheveningen which, although vacant, is presently being paid for by the STL at a discounted rate.

The total cost of the STL is to date unknown due to the fact that, even though the first 3 years have been budgeted for, there is no set timeline for the completion of the tribunal. The principle reason for the open ended nature of the STL is attributed to a clause in the mandate of the tribunal that can extend the court’s jurisdiction to, “other attacks that occurred in Lebanon between 1 October 2004 and 12 December 2005 are connected in accordance with the principles of criminal justice and are of a nature and gravity similar to the attack of 14 February 2005.” If that comes to pass the current budget for the STL may also be extended. “If anything should happen during the year in terms of activities being advanced I have to respond,” says Vincent. “I am in a position where I can go back to the committee [the organ in charge of administrative decisions at the STL] and ask them to amend or revise the budget to provide me with more funds than those that actually exist.”

The funding for the STL, like that of the ECCC, is provided by voluntary donations from UN member states. The Government of Lebanon (GoL), currently led by the “pro-western” PM Fouad Siniora, is obliged to pay 49 percent of the total budget allocated to the tribunal, a compulsion they have been keen to meet. The budget for the first year of the tribunal was initially set at approximately $35 million– to which the GoL made a down payment of 49 percent against the total– by the STL’s Management Committee.

In November of 2008, the management committee raised the 2009 budget to the level where it stands today at $51.4 million, for which the GoL has already paid its share. The total amount of money received thus far towards the first year of comes to around $62.6 million. “We do have money over and above the budget of the first year,” says Vincent. If however the makeup of the Lebanese government does change subsequent to the June elections and the country’s leadership becomes less willing to support the tribunal for political reasons there is always the nuclear option. “If during the lifetime of the tribunal the funding situation becomes difficult then [the UN Secretary General] reserves the right to revert to the UNSC,” asserts Vincent.

The expenses of the first year will cover the logistical elements necessary for the initiation of proceedings as well as the other activities of the tribunal. “The prosecutor [Daniel Bellemare] has made it very clear that he would see 2009 as still being a year where predominately there would be ongoing investigations.” Today, there is still a small team in Beirut that is currently liquidating its operations that are not being funded by the STL but rather by the UN itself.

Although the list of contributors ranges from Austria to Uruguay, the latter contributing a symbolic $1,500, perhaps the most notable facet of the list is that only one side of the countries with a vested interest in Lebanese politics have contributed to the STL, prompting further accusations of politicization. The principal contributors to date to are the United States ($14 million), Kuwait ($5 million), France ($4.5 million) and a collection of other “regional states” who have chosen to “exercise their right to remain anonymous, ” according to Vincent. The most notable absentees from the list are Syria and Iran, the other regional players in the Lebanese political farrago, who have not responded to offers to contribute and are not included in the “regional states” mentioned previously. The Syrian and Iranian embassies in Lebanon could not be reached for immediate comment. “I would treat silence from Syria or Iran exactly the same way as I treat it from Argentina or Venezuela,” adds Vincent.

As of late March, the premises where the proceedings are to be held are still under construction and are not expected to be completed until late 2009. Furthermore, the STL is still in the process of building up the facilities to handle the logistical elements related to holding the accused, housing the organs of the court and preparing the building on the outskirts of The Hague donated by the Government of the Netherlands for a total cost of $8.8 million.

As far as further years of the tribunal are concerned, many of the existing donors have already been asked to commit money. “Of course we have gone back […] to all the existing donors asking them if they could make a pledge for year 2 particularly and year 3 if they could do,” says Vincent. “The difficulty is that, for most member states, their fiscal arrangements don’t always allow them to commit money, especially when there may be an election in the next to year or so or when there is a financial crisis,” says Vincent. But there are those who look to be in it for the long haul. “Hillary Clinton came out about a month or so ago and pledged $6 million on behalf of the US for year two. We don’t think that that will be all it is but its and indication from the US that they are committed.”

That commitment will have to be solidified in the coming year as justice’s bill is expected to go up even after the construction and logistical phases have been completed. “I was asked to forecast figures for the second and third years and the figures that I came up with were 65 million for each of the next two years,” says Vincent. “We can see that that is significant and around a 25% rise in our costs that would be attributed to a predicted change the prosecutor’s activities moving from investigation to trial and there would be an emphasis on trial teams which there isn’t at the moment.”

Today the STL looks to be in a good financial position and liquid enough to fulfill its tasks. Moreover, it seems to have learned from the shortcomings of previous tribunals by shooting high in order to avoid future financial problems. Where the money comes from and what the politics of the matter are will undoubtedly be the subject of much discussion in the years to come. What is important however is that the STL retain its objectivity throughout regardless of what criticisms are levied. That will be a daunting task to overcome, especially when the court commences proceedings and the issues of proper legal processes are surely to be questioned by the defense. Nevertheless, the only certainty of the matter is, as Vincent affirms, that “the tribunal can only be judged by its acts and not [its] words.”

This article was published in a different format in Executive Magazine’s April 2009 issue